Bouncy Castle for Java fails to properly report errors when processing truncated OpenPGP encrypted messages. On the SEIPD version 1 path, the system may accept truncated messages without performing any integrity checks, allowing modified ciphertext to be processed as valid plaintext. On the AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) path, which involves SEIPD version 2 and version 5 AEAD packets, the system may silently drop packets following a literal data packet if the message is truncated at an AEAD chunk boundary and read in small increments. This results in a signed and encrypted message being interpreted as a well-formed unsigned one because the trailing message tag that authenticates the total plaintext length is never reached. The issue occurs within `BCPGInputStream.PartialInputStream`, `BCPGInputStream.nextPacketTag()`, `BcAEADUtil`, `JceAEADUtil`, and `IntegrityProtectedInputStream`. Specifically, `BCPGInputStream.nextPacketTag()` may incorrectly report an `EOFException` as a clean end of message, and `IntegrityProtectedInputStream` may fail to trigger the `PGPEncryptedData.verify()` function.