An improper input validation issue exists in the ORM save path. When submitting data through endpoints such as attribute add/edit, event edit, free-text import, sighting capture, shadow attribute proposal, event report creation, object reference add, and user admin edit, the application sanitizes records by removing the primary key and pinning the `event id` or `object id` to the caller's context. However, the ORM `set()` method prioritizes a nested key matching the model alias, ignoring the outer scalar fields. An authenticated user with basic write permissions can embed a nested block under the model alias key to bypass sanitization, allowing them to use an attacker-chosen `id` and `event id`. This can lead to cross-tenant data integrity compromise, enabling the overwriting, re-parenting, or soft-deletion of rows belonging to other organizations or events, affecting entity types including Attribute, Object, EventReport, Sighting, AttributeTag, and ShadowAttribute.