Insufficient route-level permission checks and a lack of workspace or ownership validation in the backing service allow authenticated low-privilege users or those with a valid API key to access or delete document-store upsert history from other users and workspaces. This occurs when the target `chatflowId` (publicly exposed in share links) or row IDs are known. The issue involves the endpoints "GET /api/v1/upsert-history/:id" and "PATCH /api/v1/upsert-history", specifically within the `getAllUpsertHistory()` and `patchDeleteUpsertHistory()` functions. The `getAllUpsertHistory()` function returns rows based on an attacker-supplied `chatflowid`, while `patchDeleteUpsertHistory()` deletes rows using an attacker-supplied array of record UUIDs. Exposed data in the `flowData` and `result` fields may include embedding, record-manager, and vector-store node configurations, including per-node `paramValues`.