An Insecure Direct Object Reference exists via the `OsPaypalConnectController::create order for transaction()` action, which is registered as a public route through `wp ajax nopriv latepoint route call`. The handler loads an `OsInvoiceModel` using a sequential integer `invoice id` without performing an ownership check or requiring an access-key/UUID. Subsequently, the `OsTransactionIntentHelper::create or update transaction intent()` function is called, which persists a transaction intent linked to the target invoice's `customer id`, `order id`, and `charge amount`, and regenerates its `intent key` before the PayPal guard is reached. This allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate invoices of arbitrary customers, create unauthorized transaction-intent rows linked to other customers' data, and overwrite the `intent key` of any transaction intent with a NEW status. This action invalidates the `intent key` used by legitimate Stripe or Razorpay flows and disrupts payment webhooks for those customers.