Multiple security issues exist in the software. The workflow condition evaluator uses the Python `eval()` function without an effective sandbox, enabling users who can edit workflow branch/condition nodes or import malicious templates to execute arbitrary Python code as the backend process user. Additionally, Slack and Telegram webhook signature and secret-token verifications fail open when the trigger node lacks a `credentialId` or has an empty signing secret, allowing unauthenticated workflow triggers via the public webhook URL. The OAuth authorization endpoint fails to validate the `redirect uri` scheme, which could allow an attacker to use `javascript:` or `data:` schemes to steal authorization codes and execute JavaScript in the Heym origin, potentially accessing HttpOnly auth cookies. Furthermore, `WorkflowExecutionToken`, `PortalSession`, `HITLRequest.public token`, and `OAuthAuthorizationCode` values are stored in plaintext, meaning database exposure would reveal valid scoped bearer tokens, including portal and HITL tokens with a 168-hour TTL.