The-Vibe-Dev

The default `blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin` compares parsed option names with literal dangerous option spellings, but Git accepts unambiguous long-option abbreviations. This allows attacker-influenced push arguments, such as abbreviated forms of `--receive-pack` or `--exec`, to bypass the `detectVulnerableFlags` function. Consequently, Git may invoke an attacker-selected command when these arguments are passed to a local or file remote, or an attacker-influenced receive-pack target.

The `HMACAlgorithm.prepare key()` function is affected because the HMAC key guard only recognizes top-level public JSON Web Key (JWK) forms and fails to identify container representations. This occurs when an application supports both HMAC and asymmetric algorithms and passes a public JWK container as the raw key, leading the system to accept public asymmetric key material as the HMAC secret. An attacker with knowledge of the public key can exploit this to forge tokens with arbitrary authenticated claims.

A NodeVM builtin allowlist bypass allows a sandbox escape on Node.js 24 and newer when the embedder explicitly allows the `node:test` builtin. On Node.js 24+, `module.builtinModules` exposes the scheme-only key `node:test`, which is not covered by the family-based DANGEROUS BUILTINS protection and is stored in the generic host-passthrough loader. Because the `requireImpl()` function in `lib/setup-node-sandbox.js` strips a single `node:` prefix before the builtin lookup, sandbox code calling `require('node:node:test')` resolves to the stored `node:test` key and receives a readonly proxy to the host module. Calls to `node:test.run()` are forwarded to the host implementation, which spawns a separate Node process for process-isolated test execution and passes through attacker-controlled `execArgv` values. Supplying `--eval=<JavaScript>` allows the execution of arbitrary JavaScript in an unrestricted host Node process outside the NodeVM sandbox.