PT-2026-121969

CVE-2026-98992

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تاريخ النشر

2026-10-23

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تاريخ التحديث

2026-10-23

الوصف من

الدرجة
N/A
غير متوفر

لا تتوفر حاليًا تقييمات أو مقاييس للخطورة. سنحدّث المعلومات المقابلة في الصفحة فور توفرها.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: don't copy an unmounted mount tree
may copy tree() accepts a mount whose root is an nsfs or pidfs file before it checks whether that mount is mounted. This exception exists for nsfs and pidfs mounts. They are part of no mount namespace so neither check mnt() nor is mounted() would let them through and bind-mounting a nsfsfd or a pidfd wouldn't work.
Problem is that exception also admits a bind mount of such a file when it was lazily unmounted and is only kept alive by a file descriptor:
mount --bind /proc/self/ns/net /tmp/x exec 3< /tmp/x umount -l /tmp/x mount --rbind /proc/self/fd/3 /tmp/y
With MS REC or AT RECURSIVE copy tree() doesn't stop at the unmounted mount. It copies every mount that stayed attached to it as well. So if you have a bunch of overmounts over the nsfsfd or the pidfd the whole unmounted stack is copied. That's a bug.
So refuse to walk an unmounted tree. Copying its root alone stays possible. So a bind mount of a namespace that is gone can still be recreated from a file descriptor on the old one. The file descriptor pins that mount and its root and has locked children() only reads the direct children which don't leave the parent's list without namespace sem. The internal mounts carry MNT NS INTERNAL instead of NULL and are still walked. Copying an unmounted tree recursively fails with EINVAL.
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