PT-2026-151538
CVE-2026-99357
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تاريخ النشر
2026-11-19
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تاريخ التحديث
2026-11-19
الوصف من
الدرجة
N/A
غير متوفرلا تتوفر حاليًا تقييمات أو مقاييس للخطورة. سنحدّث المعلومات المقابلة في الصفحة فور توفرها.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Copy the deferred RPC Call from the head buffer
svc defer() snapshots the RPC Call for replay once a pending cache
upcall resolves. It copies the Call starting (rq arg.len -
head[0].iov len) bytes before head[0].iov base, a back-up that once
covered a transport header. No transport has had one since commit
983084b2672c ("SUNRPC: Remove svc rqst::rq xprt hlen"), so the two
lengths are meant to be equal.
An RPCSEC GSS Call breaks that assumption. Unwrapping the integrity
service truncates rq arg.len by the length of the trailing checksum,
and unwrapping the privacy service leaves rq arg.len short by an
amount the client sets with trailing bytes after the wrap token.
Neither adjusts head[0].iov len. Both lengths are size t, so the
subtraction underflows and the copy starts past head[0].iov base.
Every deferred integrity Call replays a shifted snapshot.
A deferred replay skips GSS verification, so a shifted snapshot runs
as an authenticated Call. With the privacy service the offset is
client-chosen. A forged Call placed in that window, naming another
user's GSS context handle, runs under that identity.
Copy the Call from head[0].iov base. Refuse to defer a Call whose
length runs past the head buffer, so the copy cannot read out of
bounds.
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