PT-2026-151632

CVE-2026-99421

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تاريخ النشر

2026-11-19

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تاريخ التحديث

2026-11-19

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: always encode the origin fh when index is enabled
On an overlay with index=on,nfs export=on, copy up of a directory crashes the kernel once an LSM has started to deny CAP DAC READ SEARCH to the mounter, the task that mounted the overlay. The mount and the LSM policy change require root. After that, any user who can write to a directory that exists only in a lower layer triggers the oops by doing so.
Before a file or directory that exists only in a lower layer is changed for the first time, overlayfs copies it to the writable upper layer. This is called copy up.
On copy up, ovl get origin fh() encodes the file handle of the lower inode, called the origin. It returns NULL if ovl can decode fh() says that the lower filesystem cannot decode handles. Whether the callers can handle NULL depends on the index option:
  • Without an index, NULL is fine: the callers store an empty origin xattr.
  • With index enabled, overlayfs keeps entries for copied up inodes in an internal index directory. The name of an index entry is derived from the handle, so ovl get origin fh() must return a handle or an error.
The mount only enables the index if ovl can decode fh() succeeds for all layers, but the result can change later. The function checks the export operations of the filesystem and capable(CAP DAC READ SEARCH). Copy up runs with the mounter's credentials, and an LSM can start to deny the capability to those credentials after the mount. ovl get origin fh() then returns NULL with index enabled.
This goes wrong in two callers:
  • With nfs export=on, copy up of a directory creates an index entry for the directory. ovl create index() passes the NULL handle to ovl get index name fh(), which dereferences it.
  • If the result changes while mount(2) is still running, ovl get indexdir() passes a NULL from ovl get origin fh() to ovl verify set fh() in the same way.
Before the commit in the Fixes tag, these two callers encoded the handle themselves, without consulting ovl can decode fh().
Reproduced with a BPF LSM program that started to deny the capability after the mount. An unprivileged touch in a directory that had not been copied up yet oopsed in ovl get index name fh(). With this patch the touch succeeds and the directory gets its index entry.
Fix this by calling ovl can decode fh() in ovl get origin fh() only when index is disabled.
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