PT-2026-151672

CVE-2026-99461

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تاريخ النشر

2026-11-19

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تاريخ التحديث

2026-11-19

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: khugepaged: fix swap entry value to folio pfn()
Patch series "mm: khugepaged: fix tracepoint UAF", v5.
The khugepaged tracepoints take a folio pointer and call folio pfn(), but by then the folio may no longer be valid: freed after folio put(), folio unlock() or pte unmap unlock(), or not a folio at all but an xarray-encoded swap entry. On classic SPARSEMEM, dereferencing it oopses khugepaged as soon as the trace event is enabled; on other memory models it merely prints a bogus pfn.
Pass the pfn to the tracepoints directly, captured while the folio is still pinned, closing the use-after-free windows in mm khugepaged scan file(), mm khugepaged scan pmd() and mm khugepaged collapse file().
This patch (of 3):
When the swap entries found exceed max ptes swap, the loop is left via break with folio still holding the xarray value that encodes the swap entry, not valid folio pointer.
That value is passed to trace mm khugepaged scan file(), which feeds it to folio pfn(). On FLATMEM and SPARSEMEM VMEMMAP, the page to pfn() is plain pointer arithmetic, so the trace event merely prints bogus scan pfn. On classic SPARSEMEM, the page to pfn() reads page->flags, dereferencing the tiny encoded integer and oopsing khugepaged whenever the trace event is enabled.
So when folio is the swap entry value, simply set pfn to -1, just like exhausted scan naturally.
And the folio put() has maybe dropped the last reference of folio. The trace mm khugepaged scan file() is left with a dangling folio pointer. so using the folio pfn() before dropping the reference, closing use-after-free window.
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