PT-2026-152451
CVE-2026-99571
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تاريخ النشر
2026-11-20
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تاريخ التحديث
2026-11-20
الوصف من
الدرجة
N/A
غير متوفرلا تتوفر حاليًا تقييمات أو مقاييس للخطورة. سنحدّث المعلومات المقابلة في الصفحة فور توفرها.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-tcp: Validate the queue state under the queue lock in the address attribute
Reading the "address" sysfs attribute calls kernel getsockname() on the
admin queue socket, which can race with the queue teardown during
connection error recovery: a reader can observe NVME TCP Q LIVE set,
then block on the queue lock while nvme tcp free queue() releases the
socket and clears queue->sock without holding the lock. Once the
reader acquires the lock it dereferences the NULL socket pointer.
Commit 76d54bf20cdc ("nvme-tcp: don't access released socket during
error recovery") had the queue liveness check inside the lock.
Commit 782373ba2766 ("nvme: tcp: avoid race between queue lock lock
and destroy") moved it back out because the lock itself is destroyed
in nvme tcp free queue(), so a reader arriving late trips
mutex destroy().
Check the queue liveness inside the queue lock, and clear queue->sock
under the same lock. The teardown clears NVME TCP Q LIVE under the
lock well before the socket is released, so a reader either sees the
bit cleared or a socket that cannot be released while it holds the
lock. To also close the lock lifetime race, the queue locks are now
owned by the controller: they are initialized with the queue array and
only destroyed when the controller is freed, which cannot happen while
a sysfs attribute read is still in progress. The queue count is
computed by the NVME TCP OPT NR QUEUES() macro from the original
connect options for both initialization and destruction, as reconnects
may shrink ctrl->queue count.
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