PT-2026-152551
CVE-2026-99671
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تاريخ النشر
2026-11-20
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تاريخ التحديث
2026-11-20
الوصف من
الدرجة
N/A
غير متوفرلا تتوفر حاليًا تقييمات أو مقاييس للخطورة. سنحدّث المعلومات المقابلة في الصفحة فور توفرها.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: raw, isotp: copy socket options outside of lock sock()
The CAN RAW and CAN ISOTP specific socket options are copied from and
to user space while holding lock sock(). A copy that faults or stalls,
e.g. on a userfaultfd or FUSE backed mapping, holds lock sock() for its
whole duration.
raw notify() and isotp notify() take lock sock() of a socket that is
bound to the vanishing device while holding RTNL. As the CAN RAW
options can also be changed on a bound socket, a stalled copy can block
RTNL on an unregistration or namespace change of the bound device.
Before "can: protect the receive lists with a per-device lock",
raw setsockopt() even held RTNL itself during the copy. CAN ISOTP only
copies its options for unbound sockets, which isotp notify() skips
without taking lock sock().
Keep the user space copies out of the locked sections: Check the option
name and length and copy the option values, including the CAN RAW FILTER
filters, to kernel memory before lock sock(). raw setsockopt locked()
and isotp setsockopt locked() get the copied values directly and drop
their now redundant length checks and copies. As a side effect, a
failing copy can not leave partially overwritten options behind
anymore. In raw getsockopt() duplicate the filters under lock sock() and
copy them to user space after release sock().
As the option name and length are now checked before lock sock(), the
order of the checks in isotp setsockopt() and accordingly the order of
the returned error values changes. This is in line with POSIX, which
does not define an order in which multiple error conditions are
detected and reported.
The generic SOL SOCKET options in sk setsockopt() are not affected by
this patch.
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