PT-2026-152614

CVE-2026-99734

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تاريخ النشر

2026-11-20

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تاريخ التحديث

2026-11-20

الوصف من

الدرجة
N/A
غير متوفر

لا تتوفر حاليًا تقييمات أو مقاييس للخطورة. سنحدّث المعلومات المقابلة في الصفحة فور توفرها.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/shmem: make shmem file() check the file's inode
shmem file() only checks if file->f mapping is a shmem mapping. This mapping can belong to another file, however, as with a Coda file backed by a tmpfs container after mmap().
So it does not guarantee that the file inode is an actual shmem inode.
Seal handling and memfd preservation use this check before accessing shmem inode state, so they can access an inode of the wrong type.
Let's make shmem file() check the inode's file operations instead, to identify shmem inodes reliably. This will identify regular shmem inodes, including memfds and ordinary tmpfs files, independently of wrapper file operations.
Use shmem mapping() in collapse file() instead to not change the behavior of collapse file(): it operates on the page cache and uses mapping->host for shmem inode operations. Focusing on the file does not seem relevant.
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