PT-2026-152674
CVE-2026-99795
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تاريخ النشر
2026-11-20
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تاريخ التحديث
2026-11-20
الوصف من
الدرجة
N/A
غير متوفرلا تتوفر حاليًا تقييمات أو مقاييس للخطورة. سنحدّث المعلومات المقابلة في الصفحة فور توفرها.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/features: Ensure that count is set before access to ent[] counted by()
get supported features() assigns entries->num features only after the
memcpy() loop that fills entries->ent[] has already run. Since ent[]
is counted by(num features), the compiler's bounds instrumentation
sees a 0-length array during that loop and FORTIFY SOURCE trips on
the memcpy. Set @num features right after allocation, before any
write into ent[], so the bound is correct for the whole lifetime of
the array.
This was found via a fortify panic:
memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 384 byte write of buffer size 0
WARNING: lib/string helpers.c:1035 at fortify report+0x54/0xa0
kernel BUG at lib/string helpers.c:1043!
Call trace:
fortify panic+0x10/0x18
get supported features.isra.0+0x4a0/0x4d0 [cxl core]
devm cxl setup features+0x84/0x120 [cxl core]
cxl pci probe+0x254/0x5e0 [cxl pci]
Same class of bug, same fix shape as commit 6c9d2e87df40
("cxl/fwctl: Fix fortify panic"), which fixed the analogous issue
in cxlctl get supported features() but missed this one.
[ dj: Fixed up title typo per Jonathan. ]
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