PT-2026-152674

CVE-2026-99795

·

تاريخ النشر

2026-11-20

·

تاريخ التحديث

2026-11-20

الوصف من

الدرجة
N/A
غير متوفر

لا تتوفر حاليًا تقييمات أو مقاييس للخطورة. سنحدّث المعلومات المقابلة في الصفحة فور توفرها.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/features: Ensure that count is set before access to ent[] counted by()
get supported features() assigns entries->num features only after the memcpy() loop that fills entries->ent[] has already run. Since ent[] is counted by(num features), the compiler's bounds instrumentation sees a 0-length array during that loop and FORTIFY SOURCE trips on the memcpy. Set @num features right after allocation, before any write into ent[], so the bound is correct for the whole lifetime of the array.
This was found via a fortify panic:
memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 384 byte write of buffer size 0 WARNING: lib/string helpers.c:1035 at fortify report+0x54/0xa0 kernel BUG at lib/string helpers.c:1043! Call trace: fortify panic+0x10/0x18 get supported features.isra.0+0x4a0/0x4d0 [cxl core] devm cxl setup features+0x84/0x120 [cxl core] cxl pci probe+0x254/0x5e0 [cxl pci]
Same class of bug, same fix shape as commit 6c9d2e87df40 ("cxl/fwctl: Fix fortify panic"), which fixed the analogous issue in cxlctl get supported features() but missed this one.
[ dj: Fixed up title typo per Jonathan. ]
المورّدون
المنتجات المتأثرة
المعرّفات ذات الصلة
وجدت خطأً في الوصف؟ لديك ما تضيفه؟ لا تتردد في مراسلتنا 👾