PT-2026-153083

CVE-2026-95825

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تاريخ النشر

2026-11-20

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تاريخ التحديث

2026-11-20

الوصف من

CVSS 3.1
5.3
متوسطة
المقاييسAV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
net if ipv4 addr rm() and net if ipv6 addr rm() in subsys/net/ip/net if.c unconditionally called net if addr unref() on the target address. When an earlier removal could not complete because another subsystem still held a reference (the TCP stack takes one on the local address of every connection, in tcp conn new() and on connect()), the address is left in place with is added cleared and is used still set. A second removal of such an address decremented the reference count again, consuming a reference owned by that other holder. When it was the last one, the address slot was released, its NET EVENT IPV* ADDR DEL event fired, and the slot became reusable while the holder still believed it owned a reference.
Every address lookup helper matches on is used and not on is added, so a half-removed address stays visible to the rest of the stack and repeat removals are readily reachable from remote input. Under IPv6 SLAAC, an on-link node that sends a Router Advertisement with a short valid lifetime causes the address to expire into the deferred state; a refreshing Router Advertisement is handled by net if ipv6 addr update lifetime(), which re-arms the lifetime timer without restoring the reference, so the next expiry performs the second, reference-stealing removal. With CONFIG NET IPV4 ACD and DHCPv4, repeated spoofed ARP conflicts for the device's lease drive dhcpv4 acd event handler() into calling net if ipv4 addr rm() more than once on the same address. Where CONFIG USERSPACE is enabled, the net if ipv4 addr rm by index() and net if ipv6 addr rm by index() system calls let an unprivileged user-mode thread trigger the same kernel-side release deterministically.
The impact is loss of a configured IP address while connections are still using it, and a corrupted reference count that propagates: the slot can be handed to a newly added address, and when the stale holder later tears down, net if addr unref() resolves the address by value and drops the new incarnation's only reference, removing a live address a second time. The affected objects are static array slots and the counter is never decremented below zero, so there is no memory corruption or information disclosure; the consequence is denial of service against the device's network connectivity, repeatable at the attacker's pace.
The fix resolves the address before touching the reference count and returns false without calling net if addr unref() when the address is already marked as removed, so the public removal API can no longer consume a reference it does not own.
قابلية الاستغلال
إصلاح
المورّدون
المنتجات المتأثرة
تصنيف نقاط الضعف
المعرّفات ذات الصلة
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