PT-2026-91340
تاريخ النشر
2026-09-04
·
تاريخ التحديث
2026-09-04
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الدرجة
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: qce - fix CCM AAD buffer underallocation
The AAD buffer allocated in qce aead ccm prepare buf assoclen()
can be smaller than the length later programmed into the DMA
scatterlist.
The allocation size is currently calculated as:
ALIGN(assoclen, 16) + MAX CCM ADATA HEADER LEN
while the DMA length is set to:
ALIGN(assoclen + adata header len, 16)
Since ALIGN() does not distribute over addition, the allocation
can be smaller than the DMA length. For example, when
assoclen = 32 and adata header len = 2:
allocation = ALIGN(32, 16) + 6 = 38
DMA length = ALIGN(32 + 2, 16) = 48
As a result, the QCE hardware can read beyond the allocated
buffer while computing the CBC-MAC over the associated data.
The extra bytes are folded into the authentication tag,
resulting in an incorrect tag and causing CCM self-test
failures such as:
alg: aead: ccm-aes-qce encryption test failed (wrong result)
on test vector 8
Fix the allocation by adding the maximum possible AAD header
length before alignment:
ALIGN(assoclen + MAX CCM ADATA HEADER LEN, 16)
This guarantees that the allocated buffer is large enough
for the fully padded AAD data for all supported header sizes.
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