Breaking the Postgres Superuser Guardrails

The research shows that security extensions in managed PostgreSQL services can become a privilege-escalation vector: they temporarily switch the execution context to a role with rolsuper and then pass the original request to the PostgreSQL core. The author reports 76 vulnerabilities in such mechanisms across various providers.
• Privilege escalation via CREATE FOREIGN DATA WRAPPER — when an extension permits the operation, it temporarily switches the context to a superuser and passes the original handler and validator names to PostgreSQL. If the extension does not verify the validator's OID, an attacker can supply a validator that creates a role with SUPERUSER privileges and then grants that role to the original user.
• Function hijacking via search_path — even when the OID and the functions' membership in an authorized extension are verified, the PostgreSQL core resolves the names again after current_user changes. By creating a postgres schema and a function with the same name, an attacker can force the second lookup to resolve to a different OID, causing the function to execute with superuser privileges.
• Bypassing the lo_export() block — after obtaining superuser privileges, an attacker can use LANGUAGE internal and modify the prosrc column in the system catalog pg_proc to create a wrapper function that calls the internal implementation be_lo_export. This makes it possible to write arbitrary bytes to a file on the server, bypassing the direct block on lo_export(). The attack can then lead to remote command execution via LANGUAGE C: the PostgreSQL module written to disk is loaded as a LANGUAGE C function. In the demonstration, it calls popen() to execute commands as the system user postgres (uid=26). The author also reports a type-confusion bug in PostgreSQL's LANGUAGE internal mechanism that allows reading and writing the PostgreSQL process's memory, making access to LANGUAGE internal sufficient to achieve this.
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