GPUStack: authentication bypass via localhost trust, potentially leading to RCE

GPUStack: authentication bypass via localhost trust, potentially leading to RCE
A new analysis examines a critical vulnerability in GPUStack (CVE-2026-102895), an open-source GPU cluster manager for AI model serving and GPU instance provisioning. In certain deployment configurations, the vulnerability allows remote attackers to obtain administrator privileges without credentials. It affects versions before 2.2.0 and has already been exploited in the wild.
The root cause is the --force-auth-localhost parameter, which defaulted to False. In gpustack/api/auth.py, the get_current_user() function checked Basic Auth, JWT, Bearer Token, and X-API-Key. If none of these methods identified a user and client_ip_getter() returned 127.0.0.1, the code loaded the first administrator from the database and assigned that user's privileges to the request.
The authentication bypass can occur in two scenarios:
• Through a reverse proxy: if GPUStack runs behind nginx on the same host and accepts proxied connections from 127.0.0.1, the application treats external requests as local and automatically grants administrator privileges without credentials.
• Through X-GPUStack-Real-IP: in gateway mode, after successful gateway-token validation, client_ip_getter() can use the address supplied in the header. Setting it to 127.0.0.1 triggers automatic administrator authorization without separate user authentication. Unlike the first scenario, this requires a valid gateway token.
The resulting privileges allow attackers to modify users and settings, read GPU worker and cloud provider secrets, and create persistent administrative API keys with the [""] scope.
From authentication bypass to RCE: through POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml, an attacker can create an inference backend with an attacker-controlled default_run_command. When the backend is subsequently deployed, the command runs on a worker host. In real-world attacks against GPUStack 2.1.1, this mechanism was used to launch reverse shells.
In GPUStack 2.2.0, the developers removed the three-line code block that automatically granted administrator privileges to localhost requests and hardened client-IP handling. The force_auth_localhost parameter was retained for backward compatibility but no longer affects authentication.
On November 9, 2026, CISA added CVE-2026-102895 to the KEV catalog.
Users are advised to upgrade to GPUStack 2.2.0 or later, restrict API access, review reverse proxy settings, and stop trusting unverified client-supplied X-GPUStack-Real-IP headers. Before upgrading, setting force_auth_localhost=true can serve as a temporary mitigation. Administrators should also review existing API keys and suspicious inference backends.
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