Microsoft Defender for macOS: Arbitrary File Read and Local Privilege Escalation to root

Security researcher Eugene Lim (Spaceraccoon) analyzed two vulnerabilities in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint on macOS — CVE-2026-50657 and CVE-2026-50658. They allow a local unprivileged user to read protected files and execute code with root privileges.
The privileged daemon wdavdaemon exposes two Unix domain sockets: /var/run/wdavdaemon.sock and /var/run/priv_wdavdaemon.sock. Both have 0666 permissions, making them accessible to any local process. To verify a connecting client, the daemon obtains its PID via LOCAL_PEERPID, retrieves its executable path using proc_pidpath(), and checks the binary's location and code signature.
The bypass exploits a time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition. LOCAL_PEERPID captures the PID when the connection is established, while proc_pidpath() returns the process's current executable path. The attacker connects to the socket, sends a request, and invokes execve() to launch a signed Defender component under the same PID. If the daemon checks the process path after execve(), it treats the connection as trusted, even though the request originated from attacker-controlled code.
This provides access to two operations: • CVE-2026-50657 — arbitrary file read. The get_diagnostic_files command creates a diagnostic ZIP archive as root without additional authorization. By placing a hardlink to a protected file in Defender's log directory, the attacker can cause its contents to be included in the archive. Unlike a symlink, a hardlink passes the regular-file check. This makes it possible to read /etc/kcpassword, local account password hashes, and other secrets. • CVE-2026-50658 — privilege escalation. The handle_threat::restore handler restores files from quarantine to a specified directory. If the optional AuthorizationExternalForm field is absent, the authorization check is skipped. After bypassing client validation, the attacker can make the root-privileged daemon create a new file containing attacker-controlled data. Existing files cannot be overwritten, and the restored file's ownership is subsequently set to that of the original file.
The researcher placed a file in Defender's quarantine, replaced its contents with a cron job, and then used the vulnerable restore mechanism to create /etc/crontab. On a standard macOS installation, this file is usually absent, and its creation causes launchd to start cron. Crucially, cron does not require /etc/crontab to be owned by root: commands run as the user specified in the corresponding job field. In the PoC, the researcher specified root and obtained an interactive root shell.
Both vulnerabilities were fixed on July 14, 2026. Versions of Microsoft Defender for Endpoint for Mac earlier than 101.26042.0020 are affected.
Vendors
Products
More