PT-2026-105787 · Pypi · Asyncssh

Publicado

2026-10-01

·

Atualizado

2026-10-01

CVSS v3.1

6.5

Média

VetorAV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Summary

A malicious SSH server can wedge an AsyncSSH client, and an authenticated client can wedge an AsyncSSH server, by sending a channel maximum packet size of 0 in SSH MSG CHANNEL OPEN CONFIRMATION (server→client) or SSH MSG CHANNEL OPEN (client→server). AsyncSSH stores the peer-supplied value verbatim with no lower-bound check; the first time channel data is written, SSHChannel. flush send buf enters a synchronous infinite loop that cannot be interrupted by asyncio.wait for or any timeout. The loop body has no await, so it blocks the entire asyncio event loop — for a server, one malicious authenticated channel freezes all current and future connections.
RFC 4254 §5.1 leaves receiver behavior for a peer-reported "maximum packet size = 0" undefined, so the value must be rejected rather than stored.

Root cause

asyncssh/channel.py:
python
# process open (server side)    -- line 465
self. send pktsize = send pktsize  # peer value, no >= 1 check

# process open confirmation (client) -- line 528
self. send pktsize = send pktsize  # peer value, no >= 1 check

# flush send buf          -- lines 305-320
while self. send buf and self. send window:
  pktsize = min(self. send window, self. send pktsize) # 0 when peer sends 0
  buf, datatype = self. send buf[0]
  if len(buf) > pktsize:     # True for any buffered data
    data = buf[:pktsize]    # empty (b'')
    del buf[:pktsize]      # no-op
  ...
  self. send window -= len(data) # -= 0, unchanged
With send pktsize == 0, pktsize is 0, so buf[:0] is empty, del buf[:0] is a no-op, and send window is never decremented — the while condition is permanently true, and with no await in the body the event loop is blocked.

Impact

  • Client vector (primary): a malicious SSH server replies to the client's channel open with maximum packet size = 0; the client wedges on its first channel write. The attacker is the server, so it needs no valid credentials.
  • Server vector: an authenticated client opens a channel with maximum packet size = 0; any server-side channel write wedges the AsyncSSH server's event loop, freezing every current and future connection. A single low-privilege account can take the whole server down.
Both vectors are a single SSH message, deterministic, and cause total availability loss for the affected process.

Affected versions

<= 2.23.1 (latest release, 2026-06-06); also present on master (channel.py:465/528 unguarded). Verified end-to-end on 2.23.1.

Verification

The maintainer's proposed fix (reject send pktsize == 0 in connection.py process channel open / process channel open confirmation) was applied to 2.23.1 and re-tested end-to-end over TCP:
  • Unpatched: malicious server (paramiko forcing max packet size=0 in OPEN CONFIRMATION) + real asyncssh client → client event loop wedges.
  • Patched: the guard fires inside process channel open confirmation, the malicious value is rejected, the connection closes cleanly (ChannelOpenError: SSH connection closed), and the client does not wedge.
The maintainer (Ron Frederick) independently confirmed the freeze and noted that even shutting the server down does not break clients out of the loop.
Reproducers available: a focused harness driving the real SSHChannel. flush send buf with send pktsize=0, and an end-to-end malicious server.py (paramiko) + client.py (real asyncssh) pair. The end-to-end client repro uses asyncio.new event loop() (not get event loop()) for Python 3.14 compatibility.

Suggested fix (maintainer's approach)

In connection.py, after each send pktsize = packet.get uint32() in process channel open and process channel open confirmation:
python
if send pktsize == 0:
  raise ProtocolError('Invalid maximum packet size')

CVSS

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (6.5 Medium). An earlier draft quoted 7.5 High ("100% CPU"); the synchronous loop burns ~100% of one core's worth of CPU but, being single-threaded, the OS scheduler spreads it across cores, so the real impact is event-loop / connection freeze, not machine-wide CPU exhaustion.

References

  • RFC 4254 §5.1 (channel "maximum packet size"; behavior for 0 is undefined).
  • The same maximum packet size = 0 send-loop wedge was confirmed in several other independent SSH implementations (different languages/runtimes) and reported to each maintainer separately.

Credits

Reported by zhangph (afldl), 2026-06-20.

Correção

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Identificadores relacionados

PYSEC-2026-4026

Produtos afetados

Asyncssh