PT-2026-105863 · Pypi · Oauthlib
Publicado
2026-10-01
·
Atualizado
2026-10-01
CVSS v3.1
6.8
Média
| Vetor | AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N |
Summary
A timing side-channel vulnerability exists in the PKCE (RFC 7636) implementation
of the Authorization Code Grant flow. The
code challenge method plain function
uses Python's standard == operator for string comparison instead of a
constant-time comparison function, potentially allowing timing-based attacks.Affected Component
- File:
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant types/authorization code.py - Functions:
code challenge method plain,code challenge method s256 - Vulnerability Type: CWE-208 (Observable Timing Discrepancy)
Technical Details
Python's
== operator uses short-circuit evaluation when comparing strings:- Returns
Falseimmediately if lengths differ - Compares characters left-to-right, stopping at first mismatch
This means comparison time varies linearly with the length of the common prefix
between the attacker-supplied verifier and the stored challenge, creating a
measurable timing oracle.
Proof of Concept
Tested locally against oauthlib source (network jitter eliminated to isolate
pure Python execution time):
| Input | Result | Time (10M iterations) |
|---|---|---|
Wrong first char (B + A*49) | Fast reject | 0.34106s |
49 chars correct (A*49 + B) | Deep compare | 0.37847s |
| Difference | 0.03741s |
The ~37ms delta over 10M iterations corresponds to nanosecond-level differences
per call, which are statistically exploitable under controlled conditions.
Attack Scenario
- Attacker intercepts
authorization codevia Custom URI Scheme Hijacking - PKCE blocks token request — attacker lacks
code verifier - Attacker sends repeated requests to
/tokenendpoint measuring response times - Using timing oracle, attacker recovers
code verifiercharacter by character - Attacker obtains Access Token → Account Takeover
Note: Practical exploitability is limited due to the single-use nature of authorization codes and real-world network noise. However, the vulnerable pattern should be corrected as a defense-in-depth measure.
Recommended Fix
Replace
== with hmac.compare digest() for constant-time comparison:cr: Elvin Latifli
Correção
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Identificadores relacionados
Produtos afetados
Oauthlib