CVE-2026-98186

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length

mwifiex search oui in ie() reads a pairwise-cipher (PTK) count from a beacon/probe-response RSN or WPA information element and then walks that many 4-byte OUIs, comparing each with memcmp(). The count comes straight from the (attacker-supplied) IE and is never checked against the element's own length, and the callers admit the element on element id alone (has ieee hdr() / has vendor hdr(), no length check). A crafted RSN/WPA IE with a large pairwise count therefore makes the walk read up to 255 * 4 bytes past the element -- an out-of-bounds read of the kmemdup()'d beacon buffer, reachable from any AP whose beacon/probe response is processed during scan-result parsing.

Pass the number of IE bytes available at the OUI list and bound the walk to the element. Keep the length signed and reject a negative value before any unsigned arithmetic, so a small or zero IE length cannot underflow to a large size t and defeat the bound.

Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).