PT-2026-108617
Publicado
2026-10-08
·
Atualizado
2026-10-08
Descrição por
CVSS 3.1
6.1
MédiaMétricasAV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L
Summary
PraisonAI gates dangerous tools (file writes, deletes, shell/code execution) behind an interactive approval prompt. The first approval of a tool is cached for the remainder of the run and silently reused for all later invocations of that tool with arbitrary, unreviewed arguments.
Root cause
ApprovalRegistry.is already approved (src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/approval/registry.py, around line 181) returns True whenever the tool name is present in a per-run context set. The cache is keyed on tool name only — arguments are not part of the key.approve sync / approve async (around lines 224-226 / 278-279) short-circuit on that cache before the approval backend is consulted.clear approved (around lines 186-187) is the only routine that clears the cache, but it is never invoked in the shipped library (only in tests). The cache persists for the entire agent run and is inherited by child tasks via contextvars.Critical-tier tools (
execute command, execute code) are exempt from the cache. But high-risk tools like write file are not.Proof of concept
python
from praisonaiagents.approval.registry import ApprovalRegistry
from praisonaiagents.approval.protocols import ApprovalDecision, ApprovalRequest
class CountingBackend:
def init (self): self.prompts = []
def request approval sync(self, request):
self.prompts.append((request.tool name, dict(request.arguments)))
return ApprovalDecision(approved=True, reason="human approved")
backend = CountingBackend()
reg = ApprovalRegistry()
reg.set backend(backend)
reg.add requirement("write file", "high")
d1 = reg.approve sync("agent", "write file", {"path": "/tmp/safe.txt", "content": "hi"})
# Human prompted — approves a benign write
d2 = reg.approve sync("agent", "write file", {"path": "/etc/crontab", "content": "* * * * * root evil"})
# NO prompt — auto-approved from cache
assert len(backend.prompts) == 1
assert d2.reason == "Already approved in context"Negative control:
execute command (critical) re-prompts on every call — 2 prompts for 2 calls.Impact
A
write file approval for a benign path authorizes every later write file call in the session with arbitrary arguments. A model steered by malicious input can write to sensitive locations with no further human prompt.Suggested fix
- Include arguments in the approval cache key, or re-prompt on argument change.
- Expire the cache per-call or per-turn.
- Do not inherit the cache into child tasks.
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