PT-2026-108628

Publicado

2026-10-08

·

Atualizado

2026-10-08

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Summary

In banks.registries.DirectoryPromptRegistry, prompt file paths and the index file (index.json) do not refuse symbolic links. When a prompt directory contains or accepts untrusted files (e.g. unpacked archives, shared repositories, or multi-tenant folders), symbolic links pointing outside the registry root can be used to disclose arbitrary files via scan() / get() or overwrite arbitrary files via set() / save().

Details

Following PR #77, DirectoryPromptRegistry validates path resolution for prompt names. However:
  1. self. index path (index.json) is not checked for symbolic links. A symlink pointing to an external target (e.g. a configuration file) will be overwritten by save() upon reg.set(), or read via load().
  2. In scan(), discovered .jinja files are opened and indexed without checking if path.is symlink() or if the resolved path escapes the registry root. A symlink pointing to a sensitive file outside the root is read and indexed.
  3. In set(), prompt file.write text(...) is called without checking if prompt file is an existing symbolic link pointing outside the root.

Impact

Arbitrary file disclosure (CWE-59 / CWE-200) and arbitrary file overwrite (CWE-59) in applications where prompt directories can be influenced by untrusted users or extracted from archives.

Proof of Concept

python
import os
from pathlib import Path
from banks.registries.directory import DirectoryPromptRegistry, DEFAULT INDEX NAME
from banks.prompt import Prompt

# Disclose external file via symlink in prompt directory
reg dir = Path("/tmp/registry")
reg dir.mkdir(exist ok=True)
secret = Path("/tmp/secret.txt")
secret.write text("SECRET API TOKEN")

os.symlink(secret, reg dir / "leak.0.jinja")
reg = DirectoryPromptRegistry(reg dir, force reindex=True)
print("Disclosed content:", reg.get(name="leak", version="0").raw)

# Overwrite external file via symlink index
target = Path("/tmp/target.conf")
target.write text("ORIGINAL")
(reg dir / DEFAULT INDEX NAME).unlink(missing ok=True)
os.symlink(target, reg dir / DEFAULT INDEX NAME)
reg.set(prompt=Prompt("pwn", name="test", version="1"))
print("Target overwritten:", target.read text())

Remediation

  1. In validate index path(): verify index path is not a symlink and resolves within path.
  2. In scan(): reject path.is symlink() and check path.resolve().is relative to(root).
  3. In set(): reject existing symbolic links before writing.
A tested fix and regression tests have been prepared and pushed to: https://github.com/jankesec/banks/tree/fix-directory-registry-symlinks-and-nesting
Impactos
Fornecedores
Produtos afetados
Identificadores relacionados
GHSA-556J-VV39-8RQV
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