PT-2026-108645 · Pypi · Cairosvg
Publicado
2026-10-08
·
Atualizado
2026-10-08
CVSS v4.0
8.7
Alta
| Vetor | AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
Summary
Rendering an untrusted SVG whose
<path d="..."> contains many segments is O(n²) CPU. A single <path> under 1 MiB burns tens of seconds. Two independent O(n²) sites in cairosvg/path.py:- Tokenizer — the path-data parser consumes the
dstring with awhile string:loop that repeatedly slices/re-scans the remaining string (each step is O(len remaining)), giving O(n²) over the whole attribute. - draw markers — marker handling drains
node.verticeswithwhile node.vertices: ... node.vertices.pop(0);list.pop(0)is O(n), so draining n vertices is O(n²).
Both are hit on a normal render path (
svg2png/svg2pdf), attacker controls only the SVG document.PoC (installed cairosvg 2.9.0)
python
import cairosvg
d = "M0 0 " + "L1 1 " * 100000
svg = f'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="10" height="10"><path d="{d}"/></svg>'
cairosvg.svg2png(bytestring=svg.encode()) # ~4.4 s for a 488 KB doc| path segments | SVG size | time |
|---|---|---|
| 50,000 | 244 KB | 1.14 s |
| 100,000 | 488 KB | 4.36 s |
| 200,000 | ~960 KB | ~18 s |
Doubling segments ≈ 4× time ⇒ quadratic. Sub-MiB input ⇒ ~18 s CPU; any service rendering user-supplied SVG (thumbnails, avatars, PDF export) is a DoS target.
Reachability
Public API
svg2png / svg2pdf / svg2ps on an untrusted SVG string.Suggested fix
Tokenize with a single forward scan / index (or
re.finditer) instead of re-slicing the remainder; drain vertices with an index or collections.deque.popleft instead of list.pop(0). Optionally cap path-segment count.Correção
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Cairosvg