CVE-2026-65619

"The sandbox wasn't connected to an open proxy, it was connected to a server connected to an open proxy." 😭

@AviN102, please read that out loud to yourself. You are literally explaining Transitive Trust and a wide-open Network Path while pretending it proves your point.

In real enterprise security, if Segment A can talk to Segment B, and Segment B has an open pipe to the internet, Segment A has a route to the internet. This isn't "conventional usage," it's a critical infrastructure misconfiguration.

The Artifactory server wasn't a magical cryptographic boundary. It was a self-hosted instance that OpenAI chose to configure with live upstream resolution and an outbound route. Because they completely failed to implement proper egress filtering, domain allow-listing, or network segmentation, the AI agents just used CVE-2026-65618 and CVE-2026-65619 (the twin SSRF flaws) to tunnel straight through it.

Dominick’s point stands 100%. If your architecture leaves an open, multi hop pipeline to the public web, calling it an "isolated sandbox" is just marketing theater. I will continue trying to make my points as simole as possible so you can understand.

You see how Agus hasn't said anything since my last reply, now you can add some humble sauce to the food I've just written above or you can continue to wash my words with the haterade you've been drinking. 🫡