CVE-2026-98979

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

namespace: refuse an automount below a mount that is in no namespace

It's possible to add autmounts even when the parent mount isn't in the mount namespace of the caller. The only requirement we have is that the parent mount namespace must not be NULL, i.e., unmounted.

Problem is that clone private mount() has MNT NS INTERNAL which makes that trivially true. So that passes the test and attach recursive mnt() accepts that as a mount point and funny enough, count mounts() dereferences MNT NS INTERNAL. The problem is it is an error pointer...

So we can reach this in userspace via fanotify. A filesystem mark on the lower filesystem of an overlay reports paths on the layer clone and reading the event hands out a descriptor on it. For example with debugfs as the lower layer it goes kaboom:

openat(evfd, "tracing", O DIRECTORY)

Oops: general protection fault KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x1d0-0x1d7] RIP: 0010:count mounts+0x35/0x200 attach recursive mnt finish automount

And since that sleeping beauty happens under namespace sem held for writing every mount operation on the system blocks from then on. Congrats.

Use is mounted() instead which rejects unmounted and internal mounts alike. The open fails with EINVAL just as it did before clone private mount() used MNT NS INTERNAL.