PT-2026-121967
CVE-2026-98990
·
Publicado
2026-10-23
·
Atualizado
2026-10-23
Descrição por
Pontuação
N/A
Não disponívelNão há classificações de severidade ou métricas disponíveis. Quando houver, atualizaremos as informações correspondentes na página.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: check a submount for references right before unmounting it
shrink submounts() and mark mounts for expiry() first collect all the
mounts they are allowed to unmount and then unmount them.
Whether a mount is busy is decided by propagate mount busy() on the
tree. But unmounting the first mount changes the tree that the second
one propagates into. propagate umount()
moves a surviving overmount off a copy it unmounts and mounts it where
the copy was mounted. If that's where the propagated copy of the second
victim is looked up the overmount becomes a candidate of the second
umount tree(). It's childless and so trim one() commits it without
looking at its reference count.
So a synchronous umount pulls out a busy mount that is in use somewhere
else and marks it MNT SYNC UMOUNT while it has users:
umount2(/tmp/plshrink/p1, 0) = 0 errno 0
cwd is (unreachable)
The same two umounts requested one after the other fail with EBUSY.
This needs a mount with MNT SHRINKABLE, i.e., automounted submounts of
NFS, AFS and CIFS or the tracefs mount below debugfs. Bind mounts
inherit the flag.
Check each mount right before it is unmounted under the same hold of
namespace sem and mount lock as the umount itself. Make sure that the
algorithm stays linear.
Encontrou algum problema na descrição? Tem algo a acrescentar? Fique à vontade para nos escrever 👾