PT-2026-127188
CVE-2026-34157
·
Publicado
2026-10-27
·
Atualizado
2026-10-27
Descrição por
CVSS 4.0
7.6
AltaMétricasAV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
Security Vulnerability Report: Wails v2 — Origin Validator Bypass via Wildcard Pattern
| Product | wailsapp/wails (v2) |
| Affected File | v2/internal/frontend/originvalidator/originValidator.go |
| Affected Versions | All versions containing originValidator (latest as of 2026-03-26) |
| CVSSv4.0 | 7.6 HIGH — CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N |
| CWE | CWE-625: Permissive Regular Expression |
| Platforms | Windows / Linux / macOS (all desktop targets) |
Summary
Wails v2 provides
BindingsAllowedOrigins to restrict which web origins can invoke Go backend methods via IPC. The wildcard pattern matching in wildcardPatternToRegex converts * to .* without anchoring subcomponents, allowing suffix-matched origins to bypass the restriction.An attacker who controls a domain sharing a prefix with the allowed origin (e.g.,
myapp.community when myapp.com* is configured) can invoke arbitrary bound Go methods, potentially achieving file system access, data exfiltration, or code execution depending on the application's exposed API surface.Vulnerability Details
Root Cause
wildcardPatternToRegex converts a wildcard pattern to a regular expression by escaping special characters and replacing * with .*. The substituted .* has no restriction — it matches any character sequence including dots and additional domain components.Vulnerable Code
File:
v2/internal/frontend/originvalidator/originValidator.gogo
func (v *OriginValidator) wildcardPatternToRegex(wildcardPattern string) string {
specialChars := []string{"", ".", "+", "?", "^", "$", "{", "}", "(", ")", "|", "[", "]"}
escaped := wildcardPattern
for , specialChar := range specialChars {
escaped = strings.ReplaceAll(escaped, specialChar, ""+specialChar)
}
// * becomes .* — matches ANY character sequence, including dots and domain separators
escaped = strings.ReplaceAll(escaped, "*", ".*")
return "^" + escaped + "$"
}The generated regex for
https://myapp.com* is:^https://myapp.com.*$This matches any string beginning with
https://myapp.com, including:https://myapp.community— different TLDhttps://myapp.com.attacker.com— attacker-controlled subdomainhttps://myapp.comXXXXX— any arbitrary suffix
Scope Note
The official comment in
options.go gives https://*.myapp.com as the example pattern (subdomain prefix wildcard). This pattern is not affected. The vulnerability only manifests when developers use a trailing wildcard (myapp.com*), which is a natural misuse when intending to permit a domain and all its subpaths or ports.Impact
Any Go method registered with Wails bindings becomes callable from the attacker's origin. Depending on the application:
- File system read / write (common in desktop apps)
- Database queries
- OS command execution (if exposed via bindings)
- Sensitive configuration or credential access
Fix
Wildcards are now only expanded when they represent a full domain component (immediately after
://, ., or :). A wildcard appended to a partial label (e.g. com*) is stripped, preventing suffix-based bypasses. Comprehensive test suite added.Disclosure Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2026-03-26 | Vulnerability discovered during source code audit by @Saku0512 |
| 2026-03-26 | Private report submitted via GitHub Security Advisory |
| 2026-03-26 | Vendor acknowledgement and fix PR opened (#5074) |
| TBD | Patch release |
| TBD + 90 days | Public disclosure deadline |
Explorabilidade
Correção
Fornecedores
Produtos afetados
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