CVE-2026-99113

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: zero the FS OBJECT ID INFORMATION buffer before filling it in

smb2 get info filesystem() reports 64 bytes for FS OBJECT ID INFORMATION, that is the whole of struct object id info, but writes only 46 of them:

The response buffer is zeroed on allocation (kvzalloc() in smb2 allocate rsp buf()), so for a standalone request the remaining 31 bytes are zero. In a compound request they need not be. The offset of the next response is advanced by the length pinned for the previous one, so if a preceding command wrote its reply into the buffer and then failed, smb2 set err rsp() pins only the short error response and the next reply lands inside the area that has already been written. Only the header is cleared there:

memset((char *)rsp hdr, 0, sizeof(struct smb2 hdr) + 2);

The client then receives up to 31 bytes of a response it was not meant to see, including one that failed with an access denied error.

Clear the structure before filling it in. As a side effect version string is now NUL terminated.