PT-2026-148140
CVE-2026-99296
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Publicado
2026-11-16
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Atualizado
2026-11-16
Descrição por
Pontuação
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: bound mon command ack decode to front len
handle command ack() bounds the decode with msg->front alloc len, the size
of the reply buffer, instead of msg->front.iov len, the number of bytes the
monitor sent. mon alloc msg() routes every CEPH MSG MON COMMAND ACK to
get generic reply(), which returns the preallocated ->reply of whichever
generic request carries the same tid, so the buffer keeps its fixed size
however short the reply is. An ack with hdr.front len below sizeof(struct
ceph mon request header) + sizeof(u32), including 0, still passes
ceph decode need(), and ceph decode 32() returns four bytes that were never
received: uninitialized slab memory, stale bytes of an earlier message, or
bytes the peer planted by sending a reply that lands in the same buffer and
is then rejected. The read stays within the allocation, so KASAN does not
flag it.
req->result reaches userspace through ceph monc do statfs(),
ceph monc get version() and ceph monc blocklist add(); rbd hands it back
from write() on /sys/bus/rbd/add single major, and rbd get client() passes
it to ERR PTR() unchecked, which faults:
rbd: failed to get latest osdmap: -186318427
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfffe9ca034
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:do rbd add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7105)
Call Trace:
...
kernfs fop write iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:345)
vfs write (fs/read write.c:595 fs/read write.c:687)
ksys write (fs/read write.c:739)
do syscall 64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall 64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall 64.c:84)
entry SYSCALL 64 after hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry 64.S:121)
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Use msg->front.iov len, matching handle subscribe ack(),
handle statfs reply(), handle get version reply() and handle auth reply().
A well-formed ack has front.iov len >= 22 and is unaffected; a short one
takes the existing bad: path. This applies commit d3c32939fa0e ("libceph:
bound get version reply decode to front len") to the last decode-side
use of front alloc len in this file.
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