PT-2026-148148
CVE-2026-99304
·
Publicado
2026-11-16
·
Atualizado
2026-11-16
Descrição por
Pontuação
N/A
Não disponívelNão há classificações de severidade ou métricas disponíveis. Quando houver, atualizaremos as informações correspondentes na página.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix integer overflow in the snap trace bounds check
ceph update snap trace() bounds the two encoded snapid arrays that follow a
struct ceph mds snap realm with sizeof(u64) * (num snaps +
num prior parent snaps). Both counts come straight off the wire as le32,
so the addition is evaluated in unsigned int and wraps before sizeof(u64)
promotes it to size t: an MDS sending num snaps = 1 and
num prior parent snaps = 0xffffffff makes the sum zero and the check
degenerates to ceph decode need(&p, e, 0, bad), which always passes.
dup array() then reads num snaps * 8 bytes past the end of the message
front, which ceph msg new2() allocates at exactly front len bytes. An
unsolicited CEPH MSG CLIENT SNAP reaches this from a malicious or
compromised MDS with no client-side action, as do the snaptraces carried in
an MDS reply and in a cap import.
Compute the length with size add()/size mul() so it saturates at SIZE MAX
instead of wrapping, in the style fs/ceph/mdsmap.c already uses for
num export targets.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dup array (include/linux/unaligned.h:28 fs/ceph/snap.c:500)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880102a16c8 by task kworker/1:2/129
Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph con workfn
Call Trace:
dump stack lvl (lib/dump stack.c:94 lib/dump stack.c:120)
print report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
kasan report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
dup array (include/linux/unaligned.h:28 fs/ceph/snap.c:500)
ceph update snap trace (fs/ceph/snap.c:836)
ceph handle snap (fs/ceph/snap.c:1155)
mds dispatch (fs/ceph/mds client.c:7234)
ceph con process message (net/ceph/messenger.c:1424)
ceph con v1 try read (net/ceph/messenger v1.c:1430)
ceph con workfn (net/ceph/messenger.c:1576)
process one work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396)
worker thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret from fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret from fork asm (arch/x86/entry/entry 64.S:245)
...
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 72-byte region [ffff8880102a1680, ffff8880102a16c8)
Encontrou algum problema na descrição? Tem algo a acrescentar? Fique à vontade para nos escrever 👾