PT-2026-148496
CVE-2026-93673
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Publicado
2026-11-16
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Atualizado
2026-11-16
Descrição por
CVSS 3.1
4.8
MédiaMétricasAV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
The Zephyr WebSocket client validates the server's handshake response in on header value() in subsys/net/lib/websocket/websocket.c. The comparison was performed as strncmp(at, str, length), where length is the length of the value the server sent rather than the length of the expected value, so the check only asked whether the received value was a prefix of the expected base64(SHA-1(key || GUID)). A server that returned a handful of correct characters passed, and a response carrying an empty Sec-WebSocket-Accept: header caused strncmp() to be called with a count of zero, which returns 0 and set ctx->sec accept ok with no comparison performed at all. The header-value callback also cleared ctx->sec accept present after the first chunk, so a value split across receive-buffer boundaries was only ever examined in part.
ctx->sec accept ok is the sole WebSocket-specific gate in websocket connect(); the client does not check the HTTP status code or the Upgrade:/Connection: headers. Any HTTP response containing an empty or prefix-matching Sec-WebSocket-Accept header therefore completed the handshake, after which the socket is finalized as a WebSocket and all further peer bytes are parsed as frames. The affected path is driven directly by remote input through subsys/net/lib/http/http parser.c, and is reached by every user of websocket connect(), including MQTT over WebSocket (subsys/net/lib/mqtt/mqtt transport websocket.c) and subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c.
The Sec-WebSocket-Accept exchange is not a secret-based authentication -- an endpoint or on-path attacker that sees the request can compute the expected value -- so the impact is bounded to parties that never observed the handshake request: a caching or transparent intermediary replaying a canned response, an off-path attacker injecting a spoofed response, or a non-WebSocket endpoint the client was induced to talk to. For those, the per-connection binding that RFC 6455 requires the client to enforce provided no protection at all, letting a single crafted response convince the device it holds a live WebSocket session and causing it to send application data to, and accept frames from, an unverified peer. There is no memory-safety consequence.
The fix compares each delivered chunk against the expected value at the position reached so far, refuses a chunk that would overrun it, and accepts only once every byte of the expected value -- and no more -- has been matched; on header field() now also clears the flag for any other header so a partial value cannot be continued across an intervening header.
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