PT-2026-151517
CVE-2026-99336
·
Publicado
2026-11-19
·
Atualizado
2026-11-19
Descrição por
Pontuação
N/A
Não disponívelNão há classificações de severidade ou métricas disponíveis. Quando houver, atualizaremos as informações correspondentes na página.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: guest memfd: take the invalidate lock when unbinding a dying file
kvm gmem unbind() takes mapping->invalidate lock only if the
get file active() succeeds. When the guest memfd file is dying, its
reference count is already zero so get file active fails and the binding
is removed without holding the invalidate lock.
kvm gmem invalidate {start,end}() checks f->bindings independently to
decide whether to begin or end KVM MMU invalidation. So, the bindings
must therefore remain stable between the two calls. Otherwise, unbind
can remove a binding after start increments mmu invalidate in progress,
but before end finds the binding and decrements it.
Example, unbind race with memory failure:
CPU 0: memory failure CPU 1: memslot delete
(guest memfd file is dying)kvm gmem error folio()
kvm gmem invalidate start()
finds binding
mmu invalidate in progress++
kvm gmem unbind()
get file active() fails
removes binding
kvm gmem invalidate end()
no binding found
counter stays elevated
mmu invalidate retry() then returns 1 forever, so guest page faults
retry without ever installing a mapping and the guest hangs.
Remove the distinction between live and dying files in the unbind path.
Always use slot->gmem.file and take the invalidate lock when it's non-NULL.
Normal unbind callers hold slots lock, which prevents release from clearing
the pointer or freeing the file state until unbind completes. Final VM
teardown can only see a NULL pointer because guest memfd pins the KVM until
release has cleared all bindings.
Encontrou algum problema na descrição? Tem algo a acrescentar? Fique à vontade para nos escrever 👾