PT-2026-151627
CVE-2026-99416
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Publicado
2026-11-19
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Atualizado
2026-11-19
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: read the nlink xattr of every indexed non-dir
With nfs export=on, data written through a file handle to a lower file,
i.e. a file that exists only in a lower layer of the overlay, can be
lost on the next mount. A lookup of the file by name then returns -EIO.
Also, a file with one name reports st nlink 2 once it has been copied to
the upper layer. After such a file is removed, its file handle can still
open it until the next mount.
Before a lower file is changed for the first time, overlayfs copies it
to the writable upper layer. This is called copy up.
The index directory is $workdir/index, where $workdir is the directory
given by the workdir= option. Each entry is named after the file handle
of a lower inode, so that overlayfs can get from the handle to the
copied up inode.
With nfs export=on, copy up indexes every non-directory: it copies the
file to an entry in the index directory and then hard links that entry
into the upper directory. The index entry is an extra link to the upper
inode, so overlayfs stores the link count that users should see in the
overlay.nlink xattr.
A file can also be opened by handle, either by an NFS client or by a
process with CAP DAC READ SEARCH calling open by handle at(). If the
file is not in the dcache, its overlay dentry is disconnected, i.e. it
has no parent yet. Copy up then creates the index entry but no hard link
in the upper directory. The index entry has i nlink 1 and holds the only
copy of the data written to the file.
ovl get nlink() reads the stored count. Its caller passes a default,
which the function returns if there is no stored count. If the lower
inode has i nlink 1, the function returns the default without reading
the xattr. That was correct as long as only lower files with multiple
links were indexed.
On the next mount, ovl verify index() looks for orphans, i.e. index
entries of files whose last name was removed. For an index entry with
i nlink 1, it passes a default of 0 to ovl get nlink() and treats a
result of 0 as an orphan. Here the lower inode also has i nlink 1, so
the result is the default. ovl indexdir cleanup() then replaces the
entry with a whiteout, which in the index marks a file as deleted. The
written data is lost.
A lookup by name then returns -EIO, because a whiteout as the index
entry of a lower file that still exists is a bad index.
ovl get inode() gets the wrong count the same way. Its default is the
i nlink of the upper inode, which includes the index entry, so a copied
up file with one name reports st nlink 2.
When that name is removed, the count drops to 1 rather than 0.
ovl nlink end() replaces the index entry with a whiteout only at a count
of 0, so the entry stays, and the handle of the removed file still opens
it.
Reproduced by writing through open by handle at() to an uncached lower
file with one link. After a remount the data was lost, and the name
returned EIO.
Fix this by adding an argument to ovl get nlink() that says whether the
caller found an index entry, and by skipping the xattr only if the
caller found none.
Known gaps:
- An index entry that a kernel without this patch left behind for a removed file now stays, and the handle of that file keeps working. The entry has i nlink 1 and a stored count of 1, just like the entry of a file that was only written by handle. Without this patch, the next mount treated it as an orphan.
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