PT-2026-151639
CVE-2026-99428
·
Publicado
2026-11-19
·
Atualizado
2026-11-19
Descrição por
Pontuação
N/A
Não disponívelNão há classificações de severidade ou métricas disponíveis. Quando houver, atualizaremos as informações correspondentes na página.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: snapshot dentry names in file and setattr traces
Patch series "ocfs2: stabilize dentry names in file and setattr traces",
v4.
Snapshot names at all six users of ocfs2 file ops and at the separate
setattr event. Patch 1 handles the five ordinary file-operation callers
and setattr. Patch 2 handles release separately to preserve its locked
open-count sample and take the snapshot outside that critical section.
The release explanation distinguishes its existing RCU lifetime coverage
from name/length consistency. It does not claim that the ordinary
callers' external-name UAF interleaving crosses the held inode spinlock.
The release source change is unchanged from v3.
Patch 1 also removes the read callback's redundant NULL-inode check.
The two patches apply independently and leave trace formats unchanged.
This patch (of 2):
The open, fsync, read, write and splice-read trace calls pass the live
dentry name and length to the shared ocfs2 file ops event class.
ocfs2 setattr() passes the same unprotected arguments to its own event.
Both events size and copy a string field separately. A reference to
the dentry does not pin the external storage backing an individual name.
With an event enabled, a caller can be preempted after loading the name
pointer. A long-to-short rename can then replace the name and reclaim its
old external allocation before the trace callback sizes or copies it,
provided no other snapshot retains that allocation.
The setattr inode lock does not exclude every rename: a same-directory
rename of a source directory need not take that directory's inode lock.
It can therefore change the dentry name while setattr records its event.
Inline names and separately loaded lengths can also change during trace
record sizing and copying.
Take a dentry name snapshot around each of these six trace calls and
pass both the string and length from the snapshot. Check event enablement
before taking a snapshot. Keep the event classes and formats unchanged.
Also remove the redundant NULL-inode check in the read callback.
file inode() returns the open file's inode, which is already used by the
trace call above the check.
The historical report below is from the read path.
KASAN report as below:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in strlen+0x85/0xa0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810a5b2b18 by task python3/496
[CPU and host details omitted.]
Call Trace:
dump stack lvl+0x93/0xd0
print report+0xce/0x630
? strlen+0x85/0xa0
? srso alias return thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? virt addr valid+0x20e/0x420
? strlen+0x85/0xa0
kasan report+0xe0/0x110
? strlen+0x85/0xa0
strlen+0x85/0xa0
trace event raw event ocfs2 file ops+0xf0/0x480
? pfx trace event raw event ocfs2 file ops+0x10/0x10
? srso alias return thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? pmbd probe hit cookie+0xe7/0x1c0
? srso alias return thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? pfx pmbd probe hit cookie+0x10/0x10
ocfs2 file read iter+0x6cd/0xb30
? pfx ocfs2 file read iter+0x10/0x10
? selinux file permission+0x11d/0x540
? srso alias return thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? security file permission+0x26/0x80
vfs read+0x7d2/0xc20
? pfx vfs read+0x10/0x10
? srso alias return thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? pfx do sys openat2+0x10/0x10
ksys read+0x111/0x200
? pfx ksys read+0x10/0x10
? irqentry exit+0xbe/0x820
? srso alias return thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? trace hardirqs on prepare+0x11d/0x150
? srso alias return thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
do syscall 64+0x114/0x620
entry SYSCALL 64 after hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[User register dump omitted.]
Allocated by task 489:
kasan save stack+0x33/0x60
kasan save track+0x14/0x30
kasan kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
kmalloc noprof+0x2de/0x780
d alloc+0x5fc/0x8c0
d alloc parallel+0x106/0x11d0
lookup open+0x3ff/0
---truncated---
Encontrou algum problema na descrição? Tem algo a acrescentar? Fique à vontade para nos escrever 👾