PT-2026-151672
CVE-2026-99461
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Publicado
2026-11-19
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Atualizado
2026-11-19
Descrição por
Pontuação
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: khugepaged: fix swap entry value to folio pfn()
Patch series "mm: khugepaged: fix tracepoint UAF", v5.
The khugepaged tracepoints take a folio pointer and call folio pfn(), but
by then the folio may no longer be valid: freed after folio put(),
folio unlock() or pte unmap unlock(), or not a folio at all but an
xarray-encoded swap entry. On classic SPARSEMEM, dereferencing it oopses
khugepaged as soon as the trace event is enabled; on other memory models
it merely prints a bogus pfn.
Pass the pfn to the tracepoints directly, captured while the folio is
still pinned, closing the use-after-free windows in
mm khugepaged scan file(), mm khugepaged scan pmd() and
mm khugepaged collapse file().
This patch (of 3):
When the swap entries found exceed max ptes swap, the loop is left via
break with folio still holding the xarray value that encodes the swap
entry, not valid folio pointer.
That value is passed to trace mm khugepaged scan file(), which feeds it to
folio pfn(). On FLATMEM and SPARSEMEM VMEMMAP, the page to pfn() is plain
pointer arithmetic, so the trace event merely prints bogus scan pfn. On
classic SPARSEMEM, the page to pfn() reads page->flags, dereferencing the
tiny encoded integer and oopsing khugepaged whenever the trace event is
enabled.
So when folio is the swap entry value, simply set pfn to -1, just like
exhausted scan naturally.
And the folio put() has maybe dropped the last reference of folio. The
trace mm khugepaged scan file() is left with a dangling folio pointer. so
using the folio pfn() before dropping the reference, closing
use-after-free window.
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