PT-2026-151753
CVE-2026-99542
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Publicado
2026-11-19
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Atualizado
2026-11-19
Descrição por
Pontuação
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: deny access for an empty DACL instead of granting the request
smb check perm dacl() returns the access mask it computes to the SMB2
CREATE handler, which uses it as the granted access for the open. For a
security descriptor whose DACL is present but contains no ACEs, the
function is supposed to deny access: an empty (non-NULL) DACL grants no
access to anyone except the object owner's implicit READ CONTROL and
WRITE DAC (MS-DTYP 2.4.5).
The empty-DACL branch only denies when both
- the DACL has no trailing bytes (pdacl size == sizeof(struct smb acl)), and
- the request contains bits beyond READ CONTROL / WRITE DAC.
In every other case it takes the shared "goto err out" with rc still 0,
which returns success without modifying *pdaccess, so the caller grants
the full requested access. Three problems follow:
-
The READ CONTROL / WRITE DAC carve-out models the owner's implicit rights, but the check runs before is owner is computed, so those rights are handed to every caller, not just the owner. For READ CONTROL the SMB2 CREATE path does not fall back to inode permission(), so any user can read the security descriptor of an object whose empty DACL is meant to deny them.
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A request of exactly READ CONTROL and/or WRITE DAC is granted to any caller. WRITE DAC lets the handle rewrite the DACL.
-
A DACL that declares zero ACEs but carries trailing bytes (pdacl size > sizeof(struct smb acl)) skips the deny entirely and is granted whatever was requested.
On shares where the NT ACL is the authoritative access control -- e.g.
"force user" shares, where every client maps to one POSIX identity so
POSIX cannot distinguish users -- this is an access-control bypass.
Compute is owner before the empty-DACL branch and deny access from an
empty DACL unless the caller is the owner requesting no more than
READ CONTROL / WRITE DAC.
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