PT-2026-151761
CVE-2026-99550
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Publicado
2026-11-19
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Atualizado
2026-11-19
Descrição por
Pontuação
N/A
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: pin owning modules for open debugfs files
The OCFS2 debugfs file operation tables do not set owner. The
full debugfs proxy obtains real fops with fops get() at open and
keeps it until final release. Without an owner, this does not acquire
a reference to the module containing the table and its callbacks.
Removing the debugfs entries does not drain retained open files.
An open connected nodes file can therefore outlive ocfs2 nodemanager
and make full proxy release() read real fops->release from freed
module memory. Heming also reproduced the issue with fs state and
asked for the other OCFS2 debugfs operation tables to be checked.
Set owner to THIS MODULE in all eleven explicit debugfs operation
tables: five in ocfs2 nodemanager, four in ocfs2 dlm, and two in
ocfs2. The existing debugfs get/put pair then holds the appropriate
module until final release. Leave the open, read and release callbacks
unchanged. The blockcheck table already sets owner through
DEFINE DEBUGFS ATTRIBUTE(), so it needs no change.
The original controlled test used an unloadable OCFS2 module and
case-local probe filters without changing the candidate open, unload
or release logic. Closing a retained connected nodes file after
normal unload produced:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff804cfef
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:full proxy release+0xbf/0x190
Call Trace:
fput+0x39a/0xa60
fput close sync+0xff/0x200
x64 sys close+0x8c/0xf0
do syscall 64+0x114/0x620
entry SYSCALL 64 after hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Modules linked in: [last unloaded: ocfs2 nodemanager]
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