PT-2026-151769

CVE-2026-99558

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Publicado

2026-11-19

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Atualizado

2026-11-19

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-crypto: fix NULL deref and UAF in blk crypto evict key()
Sashiko reported a possible NULL pointer dereference, triggered by the following flow:
dm-inlinecrypt ctor # first use of the fallback ├─ blk crypto init key() # succeeds, ctx->key.size != 0 ├─ blk crypto start using key() │ ├─ hw-wrapped key: -EOPNOTSUPP │ │ # profile never allocated (NULL) │ └─ raw key: fallback start using mode() │ └─ blk crypto fallback init() fails │ └─ kfree(profile) # not NULLed ├─ goto bad └─ inlinecrypt dtr() # evicts whenever key.size is set └─ blk crypto evict key() └─ blk crypto config supported natively() = false └─ blk crypto fallback evict key() └─ blk crypto evict key(blk crypto fallback profile) └─ profile->num slots # BOOM!!!
This issue can be reproduced using the following commands:
dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/backing bs=1M count=64 LOOP=$(losetup -f --show /tmp/backing) SZ=$(blockdev --getsz $LOOP) KEY=$(head -c 64 /dev/urandom | od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' ') dmsetup create ic --table "0 $SZ inlinecrypt aes-xts-plain64 $KEY 0 $LOOP 0 1 keytype:hw-wrapped"
And the following oops is triggered:

================================================================== blk-crypto: loop0: no support for wrapped keys Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000b: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000058-0x000000000000005f] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 901 Comm: dmsetup 7.3.0-rc3 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) RIP: 0010: blk crypto evict key+0x2e/0x3b0 Call Trace: blk crypto evict key+0x24c/0x320 inlinecrypt dtr+0xf6/0x160 inlinecrypt ctr+0x2d3/0xbd0 dm table add target+0x661/0xf40 table load+0x1c4/0x490 ctl ioctl+0x32f/0x5f0 dm ctl ioctl+0xe/0x20

dm-inlinecrypt is the only caller that can evict a key that was never started, as fscrypt frees such a key without evicting it.
Fix this by returning early from blk crypto fallback evict key() when tfms inited[] is not set for the key's mode. tfms inited[] is only set after blk crypto fallback init() has successfully initialized the profile, so the crash above is no longer reachable.
The bug has been latent since commit c984ff1423ae ("blk-crypto: dynamically allocate fallback profile") was merged in v6.5, and only became actually triggerable when commit e7f57d2c47e2 ("dm-inlinecrypt: add target for inline block device encryption") was merged in v7.2.
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