PT-2026-152553

CVE-2026-99673

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Publicado

2026-11-20

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Atualizado

2026-11-20

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: replace ARPHRD CAN type checks with can get ml priv()
Commit 4e096a18867a ("net: introduce CAN specific pointer in the struct net device") introduced an explicit way to assign the midlayer private pointer (dev->ml priv) to named users like ML PRIV CAN. A valid pointer returned by can get ml priv() therefore identifies a real CAN device.
The referenced commit only converted the j1939 and proc code to this check, while the other parts of the CAN subsystem still rely on dev->type == ARPHRD CAN.
The TUNSETLINK ioctl allows a down TUN/TAP device to set its hardware type to ARPHRD CAN while dev->ml priv remains NULL. Such a repurposed netdevice passes the ARPHRD CAN checks.
Commit 8aa59e355949 ("can: af can: fix NULL pointer dereference in can rx register()") already made can rx register() reject such devices. But can rx unregister() still only checks dev->type and dereferences the NULL ml priv when it walks the receive lists of the device.
CAN ISOTP reaches this path: isotp bind() ignores the return values of can rx register() and binds the socket anyway. When the socket is released or the device is unregistered, isotp release() and isotp notify() remove the filters that have never been registered and trigger the NULL pointer dereference in can rx unregister(). This only requires owning a TUN/TAP device or CAP NET ADMIN in an unprivileged user namespace.
Convert the remaining ARPHRD CAN checks in af can, bcm, gw, isotp and raw to can get ml priv().
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