PT-2026-152575

CVE-2026-99695

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Publicado

2026-11-20

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Atualizado

2026-11-20

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: find the xattr entry again after converting a block to a bucket
ocfs2 xattr create index block() turns a non-indexed xattr block into a tree by copying it into a bucket, and the copy sorts the entries: a block holds them in insertion order, a bucket by name hash. ocfs2 xattr update xattr search() nevertheless relocates the caller's search by the index the entry had in the block, so unless the two orders agreed it points at an unrelated entry, and nothing between there and the write compares that entry's name with the one being set.
Setting an xattr whose new value no longer fits the block arrives here with xs->not found clear. The block gave up because ocfs2 xa block can reuse() wants an exact namevalue size match, while ocfs2 xa bucket can reuse() only wants an entry at least as large as the new one, so the bucket accepts a pair the block rejected and the update lands on whichever entry the sort left at that index. Equal padded name lengths get that other attribute's value replaced in place and its name left alone, so setxattr returns success while the attribute asked for keeps its old value. A longer one trips ocfs2 xa reuse entry()'s BUG ON, and a shorter one is refused by the bucket as well, so ocfs2 xa prepare entry() wipes the entry and writes the new name over it, leaving xe name hash describing a name that is no longer there.
Find the entry again by the name being set, matching the type as well. The copy carries every entry and every name over unchanged, and (type, name) pairs are unique within a block, so the match is exact. The type matters because the handlers strip their prefix before calling ocfs2 xattr set(), so user.foo and trusted.foo share a stored name, a stored length and a hash, and both can sit in the same block.
The name has to come from xi rather than from xs->here: a failed set can remove the entry xs->here names, and only the "growing" caller sets ctxt->set abort, which is what stops the conversion. Scan every entry rather than narrowing on the hash the way ocfs2 find xe in bucket() does, since an existing entry keeps the hash it was stored under, which a kernel that sign-extended the name bytes made different from the one computed now. An empty result means the entry did not survive the failed set and this has become an insert; leaving xs->here alone would keep it pointing into the block, which is rewritten as a tree root before the caller reads it again.
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