PT-2026-67581 · Npm · @Budibase/Server

Publicado

2026-07-24

·

Atualizado

2026-07-24

CVSS v3.1

7.6

Alta

VetorAV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Summary

This is a related but independently fixable vulnerability to GHSA-qqf5-x7mj-v43p (PostgreSQL SQL injection), reported in the same original disclosure and split per GitHub CNA guidance (rule 4.2.11) since it affects a separate integration, has a distinct attack precondition, and requires a separate patch.
The MySQL integration enables multipleStatements: true on the connection, permitting semicolon-separated multi-statement execution. During table introspection, table names retrieved from INFORMATION SCHEMA.TABLES are interpolated into a DESCRIBE query wrapped in backticks, but embedded backticks in the table name are never escaped — allowing a malicious table name to break out and inject a second, attacker-controlled statement.

Details

Vulnerable Code: File: packages/server/src/integrations/mysql.ts, lines 172, 305
typescript
this.config = { ...config, multipleStatements: true, ... } // line 172
...
{ sql: `DESCRIBE `${tableName}`;` } // line 305 — backtick NOT escaped
Because multipleStatements is enabled, any statement appended after the backtick break-out executes as a second query in the same round trip.

Step-by-Step Reproduction

  1. An attacker with the ability to create tables in the target MySQL database (e.g. a lower-privileged database user, or a malicious actor in a multi-tenant database) creates a table named: foo`; DROP TABLE users; --
  2. In Budibase, an administrator triggers schema introspection for that database (e.g. opening the datasource or refreshing its table list).
  3. Budibase reads the malicious table name from INFORMATION SCHEMA.TABLES and interpolates it into the DESCRIBE query.
  4. The unescaped backtick terminates the identifier early, and the semicolon-separated payload (enabled by multipleStatements: true) executes as a second statement.

Impact

Arbitrary SQL execution triggered during routine schema discovery. Unlike the PostgreSQL and MS SQL Server findings, this does not require the attacker to control the Budibase datasource configuration directly — only the ability to create a maliciously named table in the underlying database beforehand, with an administrator's normal use of the introspection feature serving as the trigger.

Correção

SQL injection

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Enumeração de Fraquezas

CWE-89

Identificadores relacionados

GHSA-2XGG-R2WC-C5R2

Produtos afetados

@Budibase/Server