PT-2026-75966 · Packagist · League/Commonmark
Publicado
2026-08-06
·
Atualizado
2026-08-06
CVSS v3.1
7.5
Alta
| Vetor | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H |
Impact
With the Attributes extension enabled,
AttributesListener::findTargetAndDirection() resolves each attribute node's target by walking outward through its siblings. For a run of N adjacent inline attribute blocks placed at the start of a block (with nothing to their left), each node scans the entire sibling list to the far-right end before giving up and falling back to the parent. Each resolution is therefore Θ(N) and the whole run is Θ(N²).Reaching the path requires
AttributesExtension (opt-in, but first-party: LeagueCommonMarkExtensionAttributesAttributesExtension). No other configuration matters — the quadratic walk runs unconditionally during parsing and is not gated by the attributes/allow allow-list, the on* hardening added in 2.7.0, or allow unsafe links. An unauthenticated attacker can submit a ~32 KB input ({#a} repeated 8,000 times) that takes over 5 seconds to convert, with time growing quadratically in input length — a cheap denial of service. Availability impact only. The Attributes extension was introduced in 1.5.0 (May 2020) with this outward-walk resolver present from the first commit, so all releases from 1.5.0 onward (including every 2.x) are affected.Workarounds
There is no library-level configuration that gates the quadratic walk. Integrators who cannot upgrade can only reduce exposure indirectly:
- Disable the Attributes extension for untrusted input, or
- Impose a strict maximum input length before conversion — noting that because the cost is quadratic, even a modest cap must be small to meaningfully bound worst-case CPU.
Upgrading to a release containing the fix is recommended.
Correção
Encontrou algum problema na descrição? Tem algo a acrescentar? Fique à vontade para nos escrever 👾
Enumeração de Fraquezas
Identificadores relacionados
Produtos afetados
League/Commonmark