CVE-2026-80962

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

dm-pcache: validate geometry fields from on-disk cache info

cache segs init() iterates cache info->n segs times indexing cache->segments[], which is sized to the cache device geometry, and get seg id() takes each segment id from the on-media cache info and the per-segment next seg link. Both come from cache device metadata that is only CRC-protected with a fixed public seed, so whoever supplies the cache device on a table load (CAP SYS ADMIN) controls them: an oversized n segs or an out-of-range id drives an out-of-bounds access of cache->segments[] and a wild CACHE DEV SEGMENT() pointer into the device mapping -- an out-of-bounds read and write from on-disk data.

Reject an n segs that exceeds the device segment count and a segment id that is out of range before either is used. Valid metadata is unaffected.