In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libnvdimm/labels: Prevent integer overflow in nd label validate()

The on-media namespace index field nslot is a u32 read from the DIMM label storage area. nd label validate() bounds it against the config area size, but sizeof namespace label() returns unsigned, so the product nslot * label size is evaluated in 32-bit and wraps modulo 2^32 before the comparison. A crafted nslot passes the bound and is then used as the loop trip count in nd label data init(), whose memset() walks off the end of the config size buffer: an out-of-bounds write.

The field is not trusted -- it comes from the medium, or from userspace via ND CMD SET CONFIG DATA. Evaluate the product in 64-bit so the bound check is exact; conforming labels are unaffected.

The check was safe when introduced by commit 4a826c83db4e ("libnvdimm: namespace indices: read and validate"): it multiplied by sizeof(struct nd namespace label), a size t, so on a 64-bit build the product did not wrap. Commit 564e871aa66f ("libnvdimm, label: add v1.2 nvdimm label definitions") narrowed it to 32 bits when the label size became a runtime value read via sizeof namespace label().